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Variability, and the Revenue
Smoothing Hypothesis
HERMANN SINTIM-ABOAGYE* AND DAVID R. TUFTE**

Abstract
This paper examines the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, which posits that an
optimizing government will adjust both taxes and inflation to meet shocks to
government spending. Our contribution is to examine this through the lens of a new
methodology that relates both the first and second moments of inflation rates to central
bank independence (CBI) measures. Unlike existing least-squares-based CBI papers,
this study uses a maximum likelihood framework that facilitates the direct inclusion of
CBI parameters in the residual covariance matrix. This new approach allows for a more
intensive use of information contained in the CBI indexes and the estimates obtained are
better reflective of CBI influences. Our results provide stronger evidence confirming the
revenue-smoothing hypothesis, in particular for those countries with more independent
central banks. (JEL E50)

Introduction and Overview
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policies and the implications for the
macroeconomy and social welfare concerns has been central to numerous research
studies. Theoretical models have been presented which attempt to capture how optimizing governments employ instruments of fiscal and monetary policies in response to
shocks to government expenditure. The latter proposition is at the heart of the revenuesmoothing hypothesis which was formally presented by Mankiw [1987]. Within the
context of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis seigniorage (indirect taxes) and more
conventional (direct) taxes are the sources of revenue for governments to finance expenditure. Therefore, how these two policy instruments interact in relation to shocks to
government expenditure, has been the subject of interest and considerable attention in a
number of macroeconomic publications. The quest has been to find an optimal monetary
and fiscal policy mix that minimizes welfare losses associated with the employment of
direct and inflation taxes as revenue sources.
Mankiw [1987] postulated and empirically examined the theory of optimal seigniorage. In optimizing inflation and direct taxes, a critical intertemporal condition will result
that implies that taxes and inflation behave in a martingale fashion (e.g., a random walk)
and governments will equate the marginal costs of inflation and taxes as the optimal
solution. That is, given a required level of government revenue, inflation and direct taxes
will be adjusted in the same direction while equating their marginal costs. The latter
condition is at the core of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis.
* Montclair State University and ** Southern Utah University — U.S.A.
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Mankiw’s [1987] exposition was a combination of Phelps [1973] and Barro’s [1979]
papers on the optimal inflation and tax-smoothing hypotheses. Phelps showed that
optimal taxation implied raising revenues from all sources so as to equate the marginal
cost from each source. Barro [1979] postulated a tax-smoothing hypothesis, which
implies a long run relationship between tax revenues and inflation. He accounted for the
effect of inflation as a tax on nominal values of debt to smooth direct taxes, thereby
indirectly establishing a connection between the behavior of inflation and direct taxes.
Mankiw [1987] tested the revenue-smoothing hypothesis on U.S. data from 1952 to
1985 and found some support for the theory. The estimates showed a significant positive
linear relationship between taxes and inflation for some countries. Poterba and
Rotemberg [1990] extended Mankiw’s paper by adding four other OECD countries.
The results showed a positive relationship between inflation and taxes for only the U.S.
and Japan. The revenue-smoothing hypothesis did not hold for the other countries. In
fact, the U.K. and France displayed a statistically significant negative relationship
between inflation rates and tax levels.
In line with general observations of macroeconomic data, Mankiw assumed but did
not directly test for the presence of a unit root in the data on inflation and direct tax
rates. Trehan and Walsh [1990] extended Mankiw’s work by explicitly testing for a unit
root and conducting a cointegration test between inflation and the log of tax rates using
U.S. data. They were unable to reject the null hypothesis that no cointegration existed
between the inflation and direct tax rates, but confirmed a short run positive relationship
between the two series.
In a more recent study, Amano [1998] provided empirical evidence supporting the
validity of the optimal seigniorage hypothesis for Canada and the U.S. over the 1953Y
1993 sample period. Amano obtained strong evidence of cointegration of the inflation and
tax variables. These results suggested a long run link between inflation and tax rates as
suggested by the revenue-smoothing hypothesis. Alternatively, Serletis and Schorn
[1999] found evidence supporting Barro’s tax (and inflation) smoothing but little evidence to support Mankiw’s revenue-smoothing hypothesis.
Clearly, evidence confirming the revenue-smoothing hypothesis has been tenuous and
inconsistent in general, and suggests that there is room for methodological improvement.
As an explanation of their results, Poterba and Rotemberg conjectured that the outcome
of the tests might depend on the role politics plays in monetary policy. To wit, certain
institutional arrangements may restrict the ability of government to manipulate the
mixture of inflation and direct taxes as revenue sources. To this end, institutional
arrangements that enhance the independence of a central bank from political influences
may restrain the inflationary tendencies of the authorities and thereby influence the
results of tests of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis.
Central bank independence relates to the balance of authority between the central
bank and the government. The more independent a central bank is, ostensibly, the less
influence the political authorities have on the prosecution of monetary policy. Indexes
have been created by Bade and Parkin [1985], Cukierman [1992], Grilli, Masciandaro
and Taballini [1991], Eijffinger and Schaling [1993a, 1993b] among others, which
measure the degree of independence of central banks across countries. Empirical and
theoretical findings imply an inverse relationship between CBI and the level or first
moment of the inflation rate. Results of empirical tests on the relationship between
inflation and CBI by Bade and Parkin [1985], Alesina [1988], Grilli et al. [1991],
Cukierman et al. [1992], Neyapti [2003], Dolmas et al. [2000], Down [2004] and Siklos
[2004] all confirm a significant and negative relationship between inflation and central
bank independence.
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This paper extends the existing literature by using CBI not only to explain inflation,
but also by introducing CBI into the inflation-tax milieu as an explanatory variable.
Further, we introduce a more advanced econometric approach that accounts for the
influence of CBI on the residual varianceYcovariance matrix. In addition, our sample
includes the four OECD countries in Porteba and Rotemberg’s paper as well as Canada
(the focus of Amano’s paper), New Zealand and Germany, which by Cukierman’s [1992]
legal measures has the highest reported CBI index. Unlike existing literature that
generally employs least-squares-based models, we formally model the relationship
between CBI and second moments of inflation in the residual covariance matrix in the
estimation process. To facilitate the latter effort, we employed a generalized maximum
likelihood framework for our examination. The CBI indexes are included in the standard
way (as in independent variable) and also in an analogous way to out-of-sample-data to
directly condition the covariance matrix with the aim to capture the full effect of CBI on
the tax-inflation relationship. This allows us to fully exploit the information value of the
CBI indexes in the estimation process, and obtain estimates that better reflect the influence of the degree of CBI. In fact, results obtained confirmed Poterba and Rotemberg’s
positive results for the U.S., (and negative results for Japan and the United Kingdom),
but contrary to their results, we overturned their negative results about France. Also, we
found suggestive evidence of the existence of revenue smoothing in Germany and
Canada; the latter confirms results obtained by Amano [1998].
CBI Adjusted Revenue Smoothing Model
The revenue-smoothing hypothesis presented by Mankiw [1987] makes the assumption that taxes and seigniorage are the only two sources of government financing, and
that the levels of direct taxes and seigniorage respond endogenously to exogenous shocks
to government expenditure. Due to the welfare losses associated with the two finance
sources, optimizing governments attempt to minimize these associated distortionary effects. On the other hand, to reinforce the credibility of monetary policy, more independent central banks tend to minimize the use of seigniorage to generate revenues
(since a loss in credibility would increase their social cost). To capture this effect on the
optimal financing decisions of an optimizing government, we modify Mankiw’s [1987]
model to accommodate the influence of CBI.
To begin with, following Mankiw [1987] consider a simple static model where
seigniorage is redefined in terms of inflation to demonstrate the welfare losses incurred
by agents when seigniorage is increased. To wit, suppose the quantity theory defines
money demand as follows,
Mt =Pt ¼ kYt
ð1Þ
Where M is money balances, P is the price level, k is velocity, and Y is output. For
simplicity, velocity is assumed to be constant. Time subscripts are standard. Revenue
raised from seigniorage at time t is then:
ðMt  Mt1 Þ=Pt ¼ ðt þ gt ÞkYt

ð2Þ

Where g is the growth rate of output and  is the inflation rate. From equation (2) the
revenue for the government may be stated as:
t Yt þ ðt þ gt ÞkYt

ð3Þ

Here  t is the conventional tax rate, and therefore  tYt is the revenue from taxes given
output.
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Still following Mankiw [1987], the welfare cost of taxes is represented by f( t)Yt, with
f 0 > 0 and f 0 Q 0. Welfare losses of taxes increase in output at a non-decreasing rate.
Mankiw [1987] further asserted that inflation tends to exact similar losses on welfare as
indicated by its social cost h( t)Yt, with h0 > 0 and h00 Q 0.1 We extend on Mankiw by
positing that the degree of central bank independence, , is an argument in h, while
maintaining the assumption that all first derivatives are positive and all second
derivatives are non-negative.
Taking cognizance of the government’s obligations that include interest payments on
past debts (bonds) and expected expenditure requirements, governments attempt to
minimize the following dynamic loss function:
Min X s
E
R ½ f ðtþs Þ þ hðp tþs ; tþs Þ
; p t
s¼1

ð4Þ

s¼0

subject to the government budget constraint:
Bt þ Et

s¼1
X
s¼0

Rs Gtþs ¼ Et

s¼1
X

Rs ðtþs þ kp tþs þ kgtþs ÞYtþs

ð5Þ

s¼0

Here R is the discount rate (made constant for simplicity), while Bt and Gt+s are
outstanding government debt and government spending. Note that equation (5) is a
dynamic form of equation (3).
Our extension of Mankiw’s model takes cognizance of the effect of CBI on the
optimizing behavior of the government. The expectation is that given the CBIYinflation
tradeoff, the present value of the cost of employing inflation for revenue purposes will
tend to be higher in countries with relatively independent central banks due to the
stronger credibility implications for future monetary policy.
Optimization proceeds essentially the same way whether we use Mankiw’s or our loss
functions. The choice variables in this optimization problem are the tax and inflation
rates. The first order conditions for this problem include the following:
Et ½ f 0 ðttþs Þ ¼ l Et Ytþs ; 8s; t

ð6Þ



Et hp ðp tþs ; Þ ¼ l Et kYtþs ; 8s; t

ð7Þ

The marginal rate of substitution is then:


kEt ½ f 0 ðt tþs Þ ¼ Et hp ðp tþs ; Þ

ð8Þ

Equation (8) equates marginal cost across the two tax instruments and also across
time. This relationship is at the heart of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis. It implies
that, given spending, governments will adjust both inflation and direct taxes together.
One of our extensions over Mankiw [1987] is that this tradeoff is now affected by the
degree of CBI.
Given all the implications of the CBI-inflation tradeoff on inflation rate, one of the
propositions for empirical study is that CBI predicts how inflation and tax rates will
interface within the revenue-smoothing hypothesis. To demonstrate the hypothesized
effect of CBI on the inflation-direct tax relationship in the context of the revenue-
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smoothing hypothesis, we impose the following quadratic functional forms on the direct
taxes and inflation functions:
f ð t Þ ¼ at 2t þ b t

ð9Þ

hðp t ; t Þ ¼ cp 2t þ d p t t

ð10Þ

In equations (9) and (10) all coefficients are assumed to be positive to produce the
signs assumed on the partial derivatives. Given  and  as the choice variables, the first
order conditions of equations (9) and (10) are:
0

f ¼ 2 a t þ b

ð11Þ

hp ¼ 2c p t þ dt

ð12Þ

Equating equations (11) and (12) and expressing the resulting relationship in terms
of  leads to:
pt ¼ e þ f  t
Where e ¼

bd
2c

ð13Þ

and f ¼ ac .

This result gives us a basis for including a measure of CBI in regressions meant to
test the revenue-smoothing hypothesis. The model in equations (9) to (13) is illustrative.
For the purposes of this study we are not interested in the (non-Greek) parameters of
this modest structural model, but rather those (Greek) parameters of a reduced form
like:
p t ¼ ’0 þ ’1 ln  t þ ’2 CBIt þ ’3 p t1 þ t

ð14Þ

Within the context of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, ’1 (corresponding to f ) is
expected to be positive. The CBI-inflation tradeoff suggests a negative sign for ’2
(corresponding to the second term in e). The stochastic term, 3, captures the random
behavior of the marginal cost of inflation and the t-1 variable accounts for any
persistence.
Data
The countries involved in this study include U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand and Canada. Since the set of countries in this study is industrialized,
Cukierman’s legal indexes are used as the measurement for the degree of CBI. Evidence
in the literature on CBI indicates that the legal CBI indexes better capture the actual
level of independence of the central banks in developed economies. Stable and
institutionalized political and legal establishments generally associated with developed
economies as compared to developing countries renders the legal measures more relevant
to the former. These indices are available from 1949 to 1989 and are considered to be
very comprehensive and detailed. GDP, base money and expenditure data were all
obtained from the IFS database. Percentage changes in CPI are the inflation rate
measures used. Following Poterba and Rotemberg [1990] and Mankiw [1987] we used
government receipts divided by the GDP as a gauge for the tax rate. The CPI and tax
data were also obtained from the IFS database. In line with the literature, the tax rate
variable is logged.
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Methodology
The CBI literature is replete with theoretical and empirical evidence establishing an
inverse relationship between the first moment of inflation and CBI. To capture this
phenomenon, most empirical studies on CBI have employed least-squares-based models
in estimation. Typically, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation is used. This
is a specific form of generalized least squares whose adoption assumes a specific form of
the covariance matrix, dictated by the sample, which in actuality may not be totally
appropriate.
The reason for this is that using SUR estimation across countries imposes a plausible
restriction across countries, but one that is at best generic for any given underlying
theory. In particular, SUR is ex postVfirst pass estimation of the system is used to
generate information used in a second pass generalized estimation. The key point is that
the observed data, rather than an underlying theory, generate the information used to
modify the variance-covariance matrix for the second pass.
This is problematic, and may explain why Mankiw’s hypothesis has been relatively
weakly supported by the data. All system estimation routines have the most to gain by
better fitting of the equations with the largest residual variance Y there are simply bigger
improvements to be had down that road. In the case of any study involving inflation data,
this is likely to be from the countries with central banks that are not relatively
independent.
What is wrong here is that this does not dovetail neatly with the revenue-smoothing
hypothesis. Dependent central banks are precisely those that are likely to have high
residual variance. This means that using SUR estimation on a set of countries whose
central banks have varying degrees of independence is likely to lead to the biggest
improvements in estimator efficiency for those countries with dependent central banks.
The implication is that by using SUR estimation, past studies have been implicitly
assuming that evidence on revenue-smoothing is best found by looking at countries
whose central banks are not independent.
We take issue with this. The whole point of maintaining the independence of a central
bank is to make sure that there is a relevant social loss function for monetary policy.
Countries in which central banks are completely dependent are precisely those for which
Mankiw’s theory ceases to be interesting because h(t, t) = 0, O. By extension, we
think that revenue smoothing is increasingly less likely to take place as countries central
banks become less independent. Yet, these will also be the countries with a higher
residual variance of monetary policy (reflecting our inability to come up with reasonable
data to proxy for politics driving central banking decisions) that the data-driven
approach of SUR estimation will accentuate!
We address this criticism by recognizing that the economics profession has a reasonable belief that CBI causes some of the differences in the elements of the variancecovariance matrix. This is ex ante information that can be used to provide more efficient
estimates without the particular sort of first pass estimation based information that has
potentially polluted previous results.
In sum, theory suggests that the residual variance across countries will vary inversely
with the independence of their central banks. SUR estimation uses the information from
a first pass OLS estimationVwhich is likely to embody that resultVto perform a more
efficient GLS estimation in the second pass. Our method cuts directly to the chase: if
theory suggests an inverse relationship then we should impose one using a generalized
method immediately. This is an improvement over SUR because our regressions are not
in fact seemingly unrelated; our theory says that they are related.
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We propose a functional form that captures both this relation and the relationship
between the first moment of inflation and CBI. To do this we go beyond least-squaresbased estimation and adopt a generalized maximum likelihood framework for our
estimation. The latter allows us to directly model the relationship between degrees of
CBI and the residual covariance matrix. CBI measures in this instance serve as the
conditioning variable for both mean inflation and the variance of inflation.
It is worthwhile to go through the mathematical details of our method. It is well
known that least-squares-based estimates can be duplicated2 by maximizing an appropriately chosen likelihood function. In this case, we are interested in the maximum
likelihood analog of SUR estimation. In a two-equation system (with the covariance term
restricted to zero for simpler exposition) there is a term like this for each observation in
the log-likelihood function:

ln ðLt Þ ¼


 X  1  e2
m
1
e22
 
1
 ln   
þ
2 ln ð2p Þ 2
2 211 222

ð15Þ

Here m represents the number of equations, n is the number of observations, @ is the
variance-covariance matrix, 211 and 222 are the variances of the residual series of the
individual regressions, and e1 and e2 are residuals for individual observations (unindexed
for notational simplicity). It is well known that estimation of regressions can be done by
least squares, maximum likelihood, or other criteria. When maximum likelihood is used
to duplicate least squares, the regression is solved for e1 and e2 and the appropriate
substitutions are made. Those numerators then contain the typical least squares regression
parametersYincluding CBI effects in this studyYto be estimated, and maximum likelihood
also delivers estimates of 211 and 222 from the denominators. In past studies in the
literature a relationship between those variances and CBI is not modeled but is readily
apparent from the results.
Generalized regression estimation uses information the researcher knows about the
structure of the residual covariance matrix to deliver more efficient estimates. Seemingly
unrelated regression is a special case of this (in which the researcher lets the data tell
him how to adjust the variance-covariance matrix). We use a CBI measure to do this
instead.
Specifically, we claim that the residual covariance matrix depends directly on CBI. To
make this operational, we make the elements of @ depend directly on a CBI measure. Our
generalized maximum likelihood (GML) estimation process will thus produce estimates
of CBI effects on both the first moment of inflation from the numerator terms and the
second moment of inflation from the denominator terms in equation (15).

Proposed Functional Form
The effort here is to try and formally model the influence of CBI information on the
moments of inflation, specifically, the implied inverse relationship between the variance
of inflation and the independence of the central bank. This is unusual but possible with
the appropriate choice of functional form. The important condition that should be
considered is the need to maintain the positive semi-definiteness of the variancecovariance matrix (VCV).
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To this end, the following relationship is proposed in a two country example; as a first
step, based on CBI literature, it is proposed that elements of the VCV are likely to be
inversely related to the level of CBI’s in country’s i and j suggesting the following:
X




1
11 12

¼
; 8i; j
; where ij ¼
21 22
ðCBIi Þ CBIj

ð16Þ

The latter expression will then need to be scaled with free parameter(s) to match inflation variances in the sample. Since variances are strictly positive, the scale factor should
likewise be positive. For this purpose we generalize to:
ii ¼

ef ðCBIi ;CBIi Þ
; 8i
ðCBIi ÞðCBIi Þ

ð17Þ

If both the covariance and variance terms are multiplied by the same scale factor we
obtain |@| = 0. To ensure |@| > 0, the covariance needs to be scaled somewhat
differently, and since the residual covariances across countries are typically smaller than
the residual variances within a country, we scale down by dividing by the following:

ij ¼

e f ðCBIi ;CBIj Þ
; 8i 6¼ j

1 þ e gðCBIi ;CBIj Þ ðCBI Þ CBI
i

ð18Þ

j

An appropriate choice of f (CBIi, CBIi) and g(CBIi, CBIj) ensures the positive definiteness
of the VCV.
Clearly, it is possible to draw the impression here that we are assuming our result,
namely that this function form can only deliver a relationship between CBI and residual
variation that is inverse. This weakness is a direct result of us having to satisfy the
positive semi-definiteness condition. However, it is critical to note that we can gage the
appropriateness of our highly restrictive assumption from the empirical results.
Specifically, if our imposition of an inverse relationship is inconsistent with the data,
the standard errors of the parameters in f (CBIi, CBIi) and g (CBIi, CBIj) will be large
enough to suggest that there isn’t a difference worth modeling between countries.
Equations (17) and (18) provide the general framework for specific functional forms of
the relationship between CBI and the residual variability of inflation. These are then
incorporated into the covariance matrix, @, of a generalized maximum likelihood model
(GML) satisfying the following for each observation:
lnðLt Þ ¼

m
1 X 1 
 ln  
Y  XB
2 lnð2Þ 2
2

0



1 

Y XB

ð19Þ

Here Y , X, and B represent the arrays of dependent and independent variables and
parameters in the set of m regression equations (and note that the covariance terms
suppressed in equation (15) are implicit here).
Equations (17) and (18) admit quite general specification. Here, we choose a simple
one:
f ðCBIi ; CBIi Þ ¼ 1

ð20Þ
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In this form the CBI effect is not included in the numerator of equation (17), but the
coefficient is weighted by the product of the CBI. The above model provides a specific
expression of the variances in terms of the inverse of the product of the country’s CBI’s
and in line with CBI literature, a high CBI corresponds to a low variance and vice versa.
As the CBI becomes larger the denominator of the RHS term becomes larger resulting in
a lower variance. The covariance is defined similarly with:
gðCBIi ; CBIi Þ ¼ 2

ð21Þ

In sum, our restrictions impose a dependence of the VCV’s terms on CBI, and a
restriction that the off-diagonal terms be smaller than the diagonal ones.
Our generalized maximum likelihood estimation routine is prohibitive to estimate for
a large sample of countries. To extend our approach to a wider selection of countries, we
estimate equations (17) through equation (21) for a small sample of countries, obtain
point estimates of the b0is, and then combine these with CBI indices for other countries to
form a (fixed) @ for use in GLS estimation. To differentiate this CBI weighted matrix
from @ we refer to it as @CBI. So employing equation (20), the diagonal elements of @CBI,
which measure the relationship of the variances of countries i and j to different degrees
of CBI would be obtained. The corresponding off-diagonal elements, i.e., the covariances,
are estimated by equation (21) resulting in the following variance covariance matrix:
2
X
CBI

6
60
¼6
6
4@

eð 1 Þ
ðCBIi *CBIi Þ





eð
eð

2

Þ þ1

1

Þ

*CBIi *CBIj Þ

1
A



eð

1

Þ

*CBIi *CBIj Þ

eð 1 Þ
ðCBIj *CBIj Þ

eð2 Þ þ1

3
7
7
7
7
5

ð22Þ

Here the overbar indicates a GML point estimate. GLS estimates from a larger sample of
countries will then be formed by substituting SCBI for S to yield the GLS estimator:
h X1
i
X1
0
1 0
b
B
I
X
X
I Y
GLS ¼ x
CBI
CBI

ð23Þ

GLS estimates are reported later. The underlying assumption is that the GML estimates
of the bi0 s are plausible restrictions for the CBI-inflation relationship.0 The latter
assumption provides support for future authors to apply our estimated bis to samples
far broader than the one used here.
Empirical Results and Discussion
The choice of countries for the estimation is problematic. The GML estimation requires a smaller sample of countries than the GLS estimation because it is more computer-intensive. However, this set must be chosen carefully. While there is no restriction
that the countries included in the GML estimator have CBI indices that change through
the sample, this is desirable. This is because there will be idiosyncratic differences across
countries in residual variance that have nothing to do with CBI. It is only the relative
changes of residual variance within a country across different CBI index values that
provide solid information about its influence. It is also desirable to have a mix of
countries involved in the GML estimation to make the results broadly applicable: big
countries and small, neighbors and not, trading partners and not, and so on.
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Ultimately, we limited the sample of countries for the GML estimation to three: New
Zealand (NZ), France (FR) and the United Kingdom (UK). This is a small set, with two
large countries, two major bilateral trading pairs, and a pair of close geographic
neighbors. Clearly it would be desirable to have included a developing country, but the
data set was not broad enough to encompass this possibility.
Results of the GML procedure employing equations (14) and (17) through equation
(21) are reported in Table 1.
The coefficients on the CBI variable for France and the United Kingdom are negative,
and significant at 5% percent level for France, reaffirming the CBI-inflation tradeoff. The
revenue-smoothing hypothesis appears to be significantly confirmed as well for France
and New Zealand, however the United Kingdom displays a negative and significant
coefficient. While noting that the CBI variable was positive and significant for New
Zealand and the tax variable was negative and significant for France, generally the
results obtained provide more evidence for both the revenue-smoothing hypothesis and
the CBI-Inflation tradeoff than most studies in the CBI literature. A major factor that
may account for these results is the technique employed in this study.
Interpretation of the b0is is more problematic, since the logistic form suggests no
economically meaningful integer restrictions that can be placed on these coefficients.
Figure 1 provides a way to interpret their value to this study.
Here the estimated variance is plotted against the level of CBI which is assumed to
cause it. The confidence intervals indicated were based on a linear approximation. The
important insight here is that the estimates of are precise enough to yield relatively tight
confidence intervals on the estimated residual variance. For example, the confidence
interval for residual variance caused by a CBI of 0.20 is outside of the confidence interval
for residual variance caused by a CBI of 0.25. Yet, changes of this magnitude are common
within countries within the sample as shown in Table 2.
The upshot of this is that the highly specific function form we assumed is not so restrictive and at variance with the data that it generates unreasonably inaccurate predictions of residual variance. This is critical because, having dispensed with the atheoretical
but conveniently automatic adjustment made to the variance-covariance matrix by SUR
estimation, our alternative methodology is capable of adjusting the variance-covariance
matrix based on the theory of interest.
The next stage of this study is to specify @CBI for the broader GLS estimation using
point estimates of the elements of the variance-covariance matrix estimated by GML. The

TABLE 1
Generalized Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Country
France
New Zealand
United Kingdom

8o
11.15
(0.375)
6.78
(0.58)
1.84
(0.32)

81

82

83

b1

b 21

2.48
(0.26)
9.28
(0.52)
Y1.19
(0.29)

Y9.25
(1.16)
36.54
(2.45)
Y0.61
(0.86)

0.21
(0.07)
0.5
(0.05)
0.61
(0.04)

Y1.692
(0.109)

4.36
(0.321)

Standard errors are in parentheses
Likelihood function value: Y154.83
Note that the values of the b0is are common to all the countries.
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Figure 1. 95% Confidence Bands for the Relationship of CBI Index Values and the Estimated
Residual Variance of Inflation

resulting @CBI based on equation (23) would look like the following in the two-country
case:
2
3
0:184
0:184
6 CBIi CBIi
8:83CBIi CBIj 7
6
7
ð24Þ
4
5
0:184
0:184
8:83CBIj CBIi

CBIj CBIj

Here CBIi, and CBIj represent the central bank independence indices for each pair of
countries.
The countries involved in the larger sample test include, the United States, United
Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, Canada, and New Zealand. This matches up roughly
with the sample used in earlier studies (although our GLS technique could be applied quite
easily to a much larger sample of countries).
Table 3 reports the GLS estimates.
As in the GML estimates, all countries except the United Kingdom confirmed the
revenue-smoothing hypothesis, the United States, Germany, Canada and France at
conventional significance levels. So in general the revenue-smoothing hypothesis appears
to be more readily confirmed using the new methodology.
An interesting observation here is that three out of the four countries that significantly
affirmed the revenue-smoothing hypothesis have relatively high average CBI levels among
TABLE 2
Measurements of CBI
Country
New Zealand
United Kingdom
France
Source: Cukierman [1992].

1950-59

1960-71

1972-89

0.18
0.21
0.28

0.24
0.43
0.36

0.24
0.27
0.24
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TABLE 3
Generalized Least Squares Estimates
Country

80

81

82

83

Average CBI index

United States

Y

0.61
(0.25)
Y0.11
(3.10)
2.57
(1.19)
0.44
(1.14)
0.04
(0.06)
0.36
(0.07)
9.43
(2.47)

1.47
(0.52)
0.94
(1.13)
0.25
(0.07)
0.41
(0.11)
1.03
(0.09)
87.10
(13.06)
Y1.82
(0.99)

0.96
(0.03)
1.18
(0.08)
Y11.10
(3.80)
3.92
(1.48)
Y16.94
(2.90)
0.08
(0.09)
0.76
(0.07)

0.48

United Kingdom
Germany
Japan
New Zealand
Canada
France

Y0.16
(0.03)
Y
Y
Y18.78
(3.95)
Y
0.16
(0.05)

0.3
0.69
0.18
0.24
0.45
0.29

Standard errors are in parentheses.
*For countries with constant CBI’s, their constant terms were dropped to avoid linear
dependencies.
**Cukierman’s legal measurements of CBI are used here. They range from zero to one, with one
indicating complete independence.

the set of countries in this study. In contrast, Japan and New Zealand, with relatively low
CBI’s, yielded insignificant but properly signed results.
Mankiw [1987] and Poterba and Rotemberg’s [1990] positive findings for the U.S. and
negative findings for the U.K. were reinforced by this paper. Our results for France
strengthen the confirmation of the revenue-smoothing hypothesis in contrast to the
weak results obtained in the earlier literature. Our results also confirm those reached
about Canada in Amano [1998] and are suggestive about two other countries.
Conclusions
We found that countries with relatively independent central banks tended to provide
support for the revenue-smoothing hypothesis. Poterba and Rotemberg [1990] suggested
in their conclusion that certain political considerations may account for the weak results
they obtained. Our inclusion of CBI seems to have captured some of those political considerations and, aside from variations in models, may explain some of the differences in the
results of this paper from others.
The empirical evidence presented in this study largely confirms the revenuesmoothing hypothesis. The observation that most of the countries that failed to confirm
the revenue-smoothing hypothesis were low CBI economies may be attributed to the fact
that the monetary policy mechanisms in these countries are likely to be more politically
influenced than in high CBI economies. This may make the behavior of variables less
amenable to prediction by economic theories. It also may be viewed as an indication that
our new methodologyVwhile a step in the right direction in accounting for the effect of
CBI on the estimation routineVis not sensitive enough to completely model countries with
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dependent central banks. Having said that, we note that our functional form is quite
general, and that more complex alternatives may adequately address this shortcoming.
The technique used in this paperVto use the CBI index to directly adjust the
variance-covariance matrix rather than the data-driven adjustment made within SUR
estimationVappears to be behind the improvement of our results over our predecessors.
The imposition of the specific and somewhat restrictive hyperbolic relationship between
CBI and the residual variance of inflation fit the data reasonably and suggests a useful
simplification for future research. We believe that the adoption of this methodology in
the future may allow for a more intensive utilization of CBI data than in past studies.
Footnotes
1
This increase in social cost may be viewed as the ‘‘price’’ in terms of credibility of policy
inconsistency, as posited by Kydland and Prescott [1977]. This is also akin to Barro and Gordon’s
[1983] inflation bias argument, or Lohmann’s [1992] insights about the costs of trading off
flexibility and credibility.
2
By ‘‘duplicate’’ we mean that any regression can be estimated by both least squares or
maximum likelihood, and that the resulting estimates will be virtually identical barring small
sample variation or distribution specification problems.
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